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an& the struggle of the elite members of ethnic groups to 
control the centre:, hightens'and intensifies political 
conflict. To many observers of the Ugandan political scene, 
particularly those of foreign (western) origins, the struggle 
for political power at' the centre among political elites 
from different ethnic backgrounds which in recent years has 
assumed violent dimensions, i s an expression of ethnic or 
'tribal' conflict and' hostility. Contrary to such views, 
this paper attempts to show that the violent conflicts that 
have bedevilled the Ugandan nation since the 1966 crisis, 
are purely political conflicts in origin, oaJuse and effect. 
The paper contends that the struggle for participation and 
control of political power at the centre, is one of the 
major causes of political conflict in this oountry. 
In the end, the paper advocates for the decentralization 
of power and the creation of a strong system of local govern-
ment as means of minimizing political conflict in Uganda. 
Decentralization has the effect of diversifying the centres 
of power and widening areas of political participation. 
This, in effect, leads to the diffusion of oonflict among 
the Various centres of power and, therefore, to the 
attenuation of the impact and effect of conflict oil the 
politioal process and the political system. Above all, 
decentralization encourages local autonomy. I t provides • 
opportunities to the broad section of the national population 
to control local decisions that, affect their daily lives 
and their immediate environment. Such popular and wide-
spread participation of the nationals in political life, 
contributes to the stabilization of the political process 
at the local and national levels. Examples are cited from 
elsewhere to demonstrate how the principle of decentra-
lization of power has tended to mitigate oonfliot and to 
ensure politioal stability, and socio-economic progress. 
But first, let us examine the theoratical question 
pertaining to the relation between pluralism and political 
oonflict. 
PLI3RAXISM- AND CONffLIOQ? 
Basically5 the concept of pluralism refers to a 
situation in which there, exists in society many groups of 
various sizes which may have, different rvalues, interests, 
ideas and aspirations.1 When applied to social and 
political organization, pluralism denotes two tendencies 
in group relations. On the one hand, given the character-
istics of the groups involved, a situation of pluralism 
may result in consensus, harmony and understanding among 
the various groups. On the other, the dynamics of plur-
alistic l i fe may produce situations of oonflict leading to 
incompatibilities in social and political relationships 
among groups. Social scientists have identified three 
models of pluralism which account for these two tendencies, 
in group relations, namely, social pluralism, cultural 
pluralism and ethnic pluralism. A brief review of each 
of those models is necessary in order to clarify the 
theoratical thrust: of the main themes of the paper. 
Social pluralism is essentially a model that explains 
the p.ersistance of democratic stability in a plural society.
2 
The pluralist model of democracy sees society as mode up of 
several social groups of Various sizes and interests. 
These groups are independent of each other and the govern-
ment, and provide a "basis for the dispersal of power in 
society. Groups intervene between the individual and the 
government; they check each otherfe power and that of the 
government thereby discouraging the monopoly of power: by 
anyone group or by the government. 
The various groups that exist in society are organized 
around common interests and needs of their members. 
Membership is voluntary and group solidarity rests on 
oivic ties among its members and not on primordial or 
sacred particularism. Individuals join groups in order to 
advance their interests and provide for their needs in 
a collective manner. An individual may belong to more than 
one group thus creating a network of interlocking relation-
ships among the various groups. Common among the groups i n 
a plural society are the many groups that are organized to 
cater for the social, aconoraic, professional and civic.-
interests of their: members such as trade unions, chambers 
of commerce, Medical and Bar. associations Women and Youth 
•rganizations etc. Such groups provide platforms for the 
expression of numerous demands said create oentres for 
political participation at: group level. 
Sinoe the various groups have different interests, 
needs and demands, the interaction among themselves 
and the government inevitably creates situations of conflict. 
However, the intensity of violent tendencies of group 
conflict are mitigated by the existance of -underlying value 
consensus among group leaders and members. Through the 
prooess- of negotiation and compromise-, individuals and groups 
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are able to arrive at a mutual adjustment and accommodation 
of the various competing claims, This mechanism enables 
society to maintain its equilibrium and consensus in the-
context of continuing conflict. In addition, the over-
lapping membership of individuals in various groups creates 
oross-outting loyalties thereby providing channels for. 
integrative communication among different groups. On the 
Whole, the theory of social pluralism believes in the 
importance of social groups as the basis of democratic 
stability and integration of society. 
It should be noted here however, that oontrary to what 
is believed to be the case, pluralist democracy does not 
promote or guarantee the dispersal and balancing of political 
power, in society. On the contrary, social pluralism 
actually encourages the acquisition and monopoly of power 
by a few individuals and groups and provides grounds whereby 
the interests of the stronger: group; of individuals pre-empt 
and dominate public policy. Pluralist democracy places a 
high premium on the freedom of interest group activity 
and on the principle that public policy should result from 
the free interplay of the various competing interests. 
But attempts at balancing the various group interests 
becomes problematic in practice-because what turns out as: 
the •ommon or. public-interest represents no more than the 
interests of the stronger and better organized groups. 
V ' " J 
While i t allows competition, therefore, pluralist 
demo.craoy promotes in reality the interests of organized 
vested interests and strong pressure groups which dispro-
portionately represent the interests of wealth and those 

3ople are divided not. so much, aver concrete social, poli 
" economic interests- "but over deep-seated cleavages arls: 
it of primordial or: sacred ties. Cultural groups exists 
aturally; they are not volutary because: membership i s 
3served for. people/ who are. born into them. Examples of 
ich groups includes ethnic, racial? caste and religious' 
coups. And because; membership is exclusive, individuals 
3come highly identified vdth and attached to the groups" 
i which they are" members':. Thus one finds that a powerfu 
msensus on values exists within a group but not between 
roups. This makes it. difficult for the various groups t 
^operate and integrate together. Normally, one group 
Dnopolizes political power, and uses its control of iftier. 
istitutions of government to dominate others. Accord-
igly, political »rder, stability and social conformity 
re maintained by coercion and not by any consensus on 
and political violence existing in the racially and 
culturally heterogeneous white dominate societies in southern 
. . . ' . . . t ... ' - . .. 
Africa. But in Uganda and the rest Africa, the cultural 
pluralism model does not seem to be of value in offering 
a viable framework for understanding situations of conflict 
and group violence. 
Attempts to account for the endemic oonfliots that 
sometimes manifest themselves in traumatic violence in the 
racially homogeneous but ethnically plural societies 
of Africa, led to the development of the ethnic pluralism 
g 
model by Leo Kuper and M.G. Smith. This model sees 
African societies as. made tip of many ethnic groups of 
various sizes and influence. These groups are distrinct 
from each otheir, on the basis of language, social organi- . 
zation and other cultural characteristics. Each ethnic 
unit forms a political entity that may constitute a centre, 
of political power and claim the identity and loyalty of . 
its members. But unlike the cultural groiips which live 
side by side but separately, ethnic groups share a certaini 
amount values which derive from a basically common culture 
and race as well as common historical and contemporary 
experiences. This enables people to interact and live 
together. However, because of the differences in interests 
and the desire to maximize influence in a competitive 
situation, groups tend to use the resources .available to 
them to assert themselves in relation to other, groups. 
Using ethnio identity and solidaristi.c- ties as weapons of 
political bargaining, the elite cadre of the various groups 
engage in constant struggles for the control of state power. 
And when they gain this control, they use political power, 
to suppress the interests of other groups and to- ensure^ 
the dominanoe of members of their own- ethnic groups in all 
sectors of employment and social and political l i fe . Such 
a state of affairs creates tensions among the in and the 
out groups and leads naturally to political oonflict and 
violence. 
There are two basic characteristics of . the pluralist 
models discussed above that should be noted. First, all 
the three types of pluralism imply the existance of multiple 
and diverse oentres of power and political activity. The 
recognition of this reality is important in any political 
arrangement aimed at maintaining a stable political process. 
In a pluralist democracy these centres are reoognized as 
independent oentres of power,influence and political action. 
The activities of the various groups are utilized to 
mitigate conflict, and to integrate society together. 
On the other-hand, political centralization tends to 
suppress the activities of independent groups and to 
destroy these groups as centres of mass political parti-
cipation. 
The second charactiristic to note is. that oonflict is 
the basic feature that underlies the process of group 
relations and interaction. ¥ith respect to social pluralism 
conflict is mitigated by the underlying consensus on 
Values. In the cases of cultural pluralism, conflict is 
contained through coercion and the political domination 
which one oultural group maintains over others. With regard 
to. ethnic pluralism, the relation between groups is 
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characterized by competition and rivalry and not hostility 
and suspecion as is the case in respect of the relations 
among cultural groups. So, the less frequent ethnic groups 
are made to oompete among themselves for power or resources 
the less situations are created for conflicts to develop 
among them. Ethnic conflicts, particularly those of a 
violent kind, can therefore be avoided through a political 
arrangement that allows little competition and rivalry among 
the groups. And this is an arrangement that gives relative 
autonomy to ethnic groups to make decisions that affect the 
control and utilization of local resources. It is to this 
political device of managing conflicts among ethnic groups 
in Uganda since the colonial times that this analysis now 
turns. 
POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION OF E I M I C PLURALISM. 
Characteristically, colonial administration in Uganda 
was based on a system that recognized the multi-ethnic 
nature of society. Following the 1900 Agreement, the 
British proceeded to establish a system of administration 
in which territories or districts that were demarcated on 
ethnic lines became the basic political and administrative 
units,''' These unite, particularly the Kingdom areas and 
more especially Buganda, were given considerable autonomy 
by the well known British colonial system of indirect rule . 
Whereas the British controlled the central government and 
administration, the power for the management of local 
affairs was retained and exercised by the local political 
and administrative, elites within the overall oolonial policy 
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and under the supervision of the colonial government agents. 
Thus the kingdom "and district political and administrative, 
units provided traditional elites and, later, an increasing 
number of educated Africans, a wide, range of opportunities 
for political participation and decision-making. 
The^ Local. Government System. 
The 1949 Local Government Ordinance strengthened 
further the, system of local government. Kingdoms and 
districts became the basic structures through which the 
country was administered. Increasingly, it beoame a 
deliberate policy of the colonial government to encourage 
educated Africans to work in their respective local govern-
ment administrations and to leave^ the central government 
8 
to the British officers. Consequently, local governments 
beoame the foci of identity and loyalty for African elites 
and centres of political participation. 
The oolonial system of local government, as estab-
lished in Ugandaj had inherent'mechanisms of preventing 
the development of conflicts fsmong ethnic groups. I n the 
first place, the system made sur.& that there were no major 
areas of competition and struggle over which ethnic groups 
could come into contact and conflict. By and large, ethnic 
groups were politically kept apart from each other. 
There was no struggle to control the centre and the 
resources involved because these were under the exolusive 
control of the central colonial government. Since sub-
stantial amount of power to make local decisions was 
decentralized and diffused among local government units,, 
4i 
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and since these units controlled critical resouroes such as 
" . \ " ' •••' for 
employment and provided also oppor. turd ties^participation to 
many traditional and educated elites, ethnic groups had 
limited areas of contact upon which conflicts could develop 
among them. I t is this device of dispersing power among 
local political units which ensured that the oentre was 
kept under relatively less pressure of political activity. 
For the ethnic, groups, the centre was not an object for 
competition and struggle artong them. And it is precisely 
this device that enabled the colonial government to -maintain 
political stability and social harmony in potential 
situations of explosive ethnic oonflict. 
The 1962 Independence Constitution. 
The need to control and accommodate conflict arising 
out of ethnic pluralism was one of the important factors 
that determined the structure and provisions of the 1962 
constitution which the British left behind on the country's 
Q 
attainment of independence. The Independence constitution 
was indeed an ingeneous act of social engineering that 
reflected an understanding of the complexity of Uganda's 
social and political forces on the part of the departing 
British. I t sought to continue and strengthen the ex^niment 
that had began early in the colonial times of dispersing 
power among the various ethnic units and broadening areas 
of mass political participation. The main features of the 
constitution that were specifically aimed at avoiding the 
possibilities of ethnic tensions and conflicts included the 
granting of greater degrees of autonomy tb kingdom and, to 
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a lesser degree, district administrations; the establishment 
of a strong system of local government and the expansion of 
areas of looal political participation and representation 
in the form of elected councils for each district. Let us 
look at this important feature- of the constitution a little 
further. 
Uganda's Independence constitution was a unique 
document that- contained both elements of unitarism and 
federalism. Shis in itself was a reflection of the country's 
peouliar social and political structure that, needed an 
intricate arrangement that was capable of holding the multi-
ethnic nation together in relative peace and stability. 
What was required for the purposes of avoiding the problem 
of ethnic oonflict, was. a political device which the- British 
had tried before with remarkable success. This was a device^ 
which has already been mentioned, that provided ethnic 
groups with sufficient powers to conduct their own affairs 
and which, therefore, left the centre relatively free from 
ethnic-based political activity. As long as ethnic groups 
enjoyed such powers, they regarded the centre to be- of less 
importance as an object of struggle for control. Increas-
ingly, a wider section of traditional and modern elites 
were inclined to seek political participation in local 
units rather than the centre. And this device had the 
effect of maintaining political stability by decongesting 
_ the centre of the heat, of politi-cal struggle and conflict. 
In full recognition of this need, therefore, the 1962 
constitution decentralized political power and dispersed 
it among the various local units with varying degrees of 
r 
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autonomy. Buganda, the largest and most prestigious kingdom 
in the oountry, was granted full federal status in relation 
with the centre:; while the smaller: kingdoms of Bunyoro, Toro, 
Ankole and the territory of Buscga were each granted 
a federal status of a lesser degree. The rest of the ethnic 
groups that werer organized in district politloal units and 
which historically did not have, hereditary traditional 
rulers, maintained unitary relationships with the central 
government. 
In terms of power, the kingdom of Buganda with its 
own government and system of administration, enjoyed 
considerable autonomy and controlled a wide range of resource 
At the centre of political activity was the institution of 
the Kabaka (the King ) and the Great I^ciiko, - the Assembly -
which was constituted by a large size of elected represent-
atives. The system of administration was organized in 
ministries each of which was headed by a political Minister. 
As a political unit that was built around the Baganda ethnic 
group, the Buganda 
kingdom government provided a wide range of avenues for 
high j^cilled employment, in its system of administration. 
It: also provided broad areas of political participation to 
a wide section of both traditional and eduoated Baganda 
elites. Indeed, there were many Baganda political slates 
who had built viable political careers in the Buganda 
political system and who were: forced to turn to national 
politics only after the destruction of the kingdom in 1966."^ 
But while the kingdom government existed as a local political 
unit, it. served to absorb thousands of political and admini-
strative elites and to prevent thereby, the building-up' of 
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The powers which. Buganda enjoyed under the 1962 consti-
tution as well as the basic political. and administrative 
institutions which existed in the kingdom, were to be?, found 
1" • • ! j: " • • • ' v>\ 
also in other kingdoms^ although these; were relatively of 
lesser degree of importance and significance. Thus, each 
kingdom government had an elected assembly e^ s. the centre of 
political activity and decision-making. I t had also compa-
ratively smaller compliment of ministerial departments around 
which the administrative system of the kingdom government- was 
organized. Like the Buganda Government, 
/the other, kingdom governments too provided opportunities 
for employment and political participation to large sections 
of traditional and educated elites and relieved pressure 
that would otherwise have been exerted on the central govern-
ment by people pursuing these valuee and goals. 
With respect to the non kingdom unitary districts, 
the constitution provided for the devolution of power by 
the oentral government to an elected council in each 
district. Essentially, the districts were directly governed 
by the centre. But the cotmcils exercised powers and 
performed functions that were, conferred upon them by law. 
At independence, district councils derived their, power: from, 
and their functions were defined by, the Local Administration 
Ordinance of 1962. And the functions of these oouncils 
were of such magnitude and importance as to necessitate the 
establishment and maintainance of a system of. local admini-
stration that, employed thousands of local traditional and 
modern elites. As local political and administrative, units, 
therefore,, district administrations catered for the needs 
for employment and political participation and kept away 
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from the centre a large section of politically active elites, 
Thus we find that the 1962 constitution embodied 
important features of politioal pluralism. The constitution 
reoognized the political life of ethnic groups by providing 
for the decentralization and dispersal of power among the 
political units of the various groups. It is this principle 
of constitutional pluralism that, regulated and oontrolled 
ethnic oonflicts and stabilized the political process at 
the national Level, As. we shall proceed to show presently, 
i t was the abilitlon of this constitutional provision and 
safeguard that signalled the entry in national politics 
of bitter and, on the most part, violent ethnio conflicts-
and struggle. 
A further legal provision that strengthened the. 
foundations of the politics of political pluralism in 
Uganda, was the Constitutional Heads (Elections) Act No. 66 
1? 
of 1963. Enacted by the National Assembly hardly a year 
after independence, the Act allowed the magnitude of the 
pressure of non kingdom ethnio groups for. more power, 
recognition and status. The Act provided for the election 
by District Council® of Constitutional Heads in districts 
who were to oocupy the status and perform the functions 
that were more or less similar: to those, of the hereditary 
rulers in the kingdom areas. This Act expanded further 
the areas of political participation at the local level. 
Some notable national political elites relinquished their 
positions at. the centre: to become Constitutional Heads of 
their d istr icts . ^ 
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The foregoing analysis has focused on the discussion 
of the political and institutional arrangements for the 
oontrol of political conflict and inter-ethnic political 
-violence. Acr already indicated, these arrangements were 
to be found in two areas of colonial initiative. The first 
Was the system of local government that, was organized around 
ethnic groups as political and administrative units. These 
units were given wide-ranging powers to deal with matters 
and problems of local concern. The second arrangement was 
enshrined in the Independence Constitution whioh decentra-
lized and liberalized the political structure and gave 
definite constitutional powers to local political units 
both federal and unitary. As long, as these arrangements-
remained in force, the country enjoyed periods of relative 
stability, peace and socio-eaoonomie development. But this 
was not to last long as the proceeding discussion attempts 
to show. 
TjRENDS TOWARDS J?0MJ1CJ£ THE .CONTEXT OF 
POLITICAL CONFLICT IN UGANDA. 
Eor a period of approximately four years of independence., 
the central government: led by Prime Minister Apolo Milton 
Obote remained relatively stable, strong and .free from 
traumatio oonflicts. Its main political- challenges and 
pre-oooupations' of the time were confined largely to the 
role of refereeing ever, conflicts and disputes among local 
political units, mainly Buganda and Bunyoro.14 'But by and' 
large, the kingdom and district administrations remained 
inward looking and apparently contented with the powers and 
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functions conferred upon them "by the constitution and other, 
laws under i t . As long as "the central government refrained 
from tampering with these: powers and functions and was seen 
to be fair in dealing with matters of concern to ethnic 
groups, looal political units remained largely disinterested 
in the politics at: the centre. But the moment the central 
government started encroaching on the powers of the federated 
states, particularly those of Buganda, and was perceived 
to be using its powers unfairly to surpre-ss the interests' 
and aspirations of local political entities, the relationship 
between the central government and local administrations 
became increasingly strained. Gradually, the strained 
relationships between the centre and the looal political 
Units, particularly Buganda, forced the looal -units to enter 
the central political arena to assert- themselves.^ I n the 
fa„ce of the challenges emanating from other oentres of power, 
the central government reacted by attempting to reassert its 
supremacy over local political units. The increasingly 
developing oonflicts between Buganda and the central govern-
ment provided opportunity for the central government to 
accumulate more power, by undermining the powers of the local 
political units. In other words, as time: went on the central 
governent embarked on a consciously calculated process of 
political, centralization which draw more and more, local 
political entities and their most, active political elites 
into the imbroglio of political competition and struggle at 
the oentre.. 
The process of political centralization passed through 
three, phases that represented a period of fundamental 
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politioal ohanges in the country's post-independence history 
namely, the Buganda. crisis of 1966 that resulted in the 
demise of the foundations of political pluralism in Uganda -
the 1962 constitution, the advent of the 1967 constitution 
that abolished kingdoms and, finally, the imposition of the 
one-party state in 1969 which signalled the end of the 
politics of institutional and legal opposition and conferred 
anthoritarian outlook on the central government. 
Coming from Lango district, a norikingdom area? and 
17 
guided "by the 'revolutionary-centralizing' philosophy, 
Milton 0bote; was culturally and politically inclined to 
prefer a unitary form of government for the whole country. 
During the Constitutional Conference: in London in September 
1961. Obote aame out strongly in favour, of supreme/powers 
for. the central government. But the pressures from the 
kingdoms, particularly Buganda, led to the spli ting of state 
powers between the centre and the federal states. I t i s , 
this constitutional enoumberance. and the tendencies of 
Buganda to guard its federal status jealously against the? 
encroaohment of the central government that prevented Prime 
Minister Obote from pursuing his preferred vision of political 
centralization as eagrly as he would have wished. The 
opportunity for fulfilling this vision was presented by the 
events that led to the 1.966 crisis which Obote handled to 
his advantage with political skills that earned him admiratinn 
even among his political •pponents. 
The 1966 Crisis 
The 1966 crisis was a culmination of two main political 
developments. The first, of these was the break-up in 1964 of 
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the ruling alliance between Obote1 s Uganda Peoples Congress 
(UPC) and Buganda'a Kabaka Yekka (KY)'.18 This led to the 
political relations between Obote;'s Central government an-d 
the Kabaka1 s Buganda. government based at Mengo becoming 
strained. The second was the internal factional conflicts 
within the UPC which Resulted into the arrest and detention 
of some of Obote's. Ministers, the suspension of the 1962 
Constitution and further deterioration of the relations 
between Buganda and the central government. As these, deve-
1q 
lopments are fully documented elsewhere, only a short 
outline will be given here. 
In what was seen to be an 'Unholy Marriage', the UPC 
led by Milton Obote entered into an alliance with the KY 
in 1961. This alliance was clearly aimed at ousting the 
Democratic Party (DP) led by Ben Kiwanuka from power^0 at 
the pr e-independence general elections that were later 
scheduled to take place, in April 1962. The alliance was 
seen as unholy because, of the evidently divergent socio-
political outlooks of the two parties. The KY was basically 
a traditionalist party whose main pr ^ -occupation was the 
glorification and preservation of the institution of the 
Kabakaship and the protection of Buganda interests.. The-
UPC on the other hand was led by men with a modern vision 
of the state - men who exhibited nationalist outlooks and 
tendencies in favour; of a unitarist government. By and large, 
the UPC - KY fraternity was seei^ as an alliance of 
convenience whose: inherent contradictions were sooner: or 
later to cause problems for the alliance itself. 
— 21 « 
The alliance consisted of a series of mutual under-
standing between the UPC and KY. One of these was that KY 
would have the exclusive right to field all candidates in 
Buganda in competition with the DP in the event of a direct 
election to the National Assembly and the UPC would field 
candidates only in the rest of Uganda. The two parties would 
then join forces at the national level in Parliament. 
Details were worked out as to how the two parties were, to 
share power i f the alliance won the elections. 
The 1962 constitution provided for direct elections 
to the Buganda Lukiiko and gave powers to the Lukiilco to 
decide whether Buganda's twenty-two representatives to 
the National Assembly were to be directly elected bjr the. 
people., as was to be the case; in the rest of the country, 
or nominated by the Lukiiko. Early in 1962r elections to 
the Lukiiko were~- held and turned out to be a oontest between 
KY and DP which the KY won overwhelmingly". Then during 
the national elections'in April of that year, the Lukiiko 
derided that Buganda's represent!ves to Parliament were, to 
be-nominated by the Lukiiko. This left the DP in the cold 
without any represent!ves from Buganda beoause those who 
were nominated by the Lukiiko to represent Buganda in 
Parliament were all KY men. With UPC winning the majority 
of seats in the rest of the country, the combined strength 
of the Lukiiko nominees' and the UPC's elected representatives 
placed the UPC-KY alliance into power. 
Uganda, therefore, entered the period of independence 
with the UPC-KY delicate political outfit in power. But 
this outfit was. not destined to last long. The incompatibili-
ties between the two parties did not permit them to work , 
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harmoniously together and soon the "basic divisions and 
conflicts between them came into full view* At first Obote 
had to tolerate many of the problems that were caused for 
him by KY being in government. But when the UPO became 
increasingly strong sgnd dominant as a result of the cross-
overs in Parliament by mainly DP members of Parliament, 
Obote summarily terminated the alliance in August, 1964' and 
removed KY ministers from office. This saw the end to the 
working reletionship. between Buganda and the central govern-
ment and plotted the path of political confrontation between 
towards the . „ 
the two. I t was this tendency^gradual monopolization of 
power by one group- the UPC - that ushered in the beginning 
of a period of political conflict at the oentre 
Yet it was the contradictions within the UPC itself, 
rather than the break-up of the party's alliance with KY, 
that- triggered off the 1966 crisis. Eight from its formation 
in 1960, the UPC could be said to consist .of two factional 
tendencies: one progressive and socialist- inolined and 
the other conservative and pro-capitalism. The factions 
based on these two tendencies oame into open oonflict: and • 
struggle for the control of the party during the 1964 Annual 
Delegates Conference of the UPC that was held in G-ulu Town. 
In the election to the key position of Secretary-General .of 
the party, the radical socialist-inclined incumbent, John ' 
Kakonge, lost to the challenge of Grace Ibingira representing 
the conservative capitalist wing of the party. The accedsncy 
of the ambitioue Ibingira to the powerful party post of 
Secretary-General placed him in a position in which he began 
to aspire to the' leadership of the party itself and 
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ultimately of the government, "both of which positions were 
held by Obote at. the time. Through scheming, manipulations 
and forming.of strategic alliances, Ibingira and his 
supporters in the party and government sought to undermine 
the power and position of the prime minister with the sole 
aim of throwing Obofe out of power. In one politically 
significant incident-in February 1966, • Ibingira and his 
group collaborated with the DP and KY members of parliament 
to support a motion tabled by a leading KY member, Daudi 
0oheng, accusing Prim® Minister Obote, three of his close 
iijinisters and army chief of staff Col.Idi Amin of impropriety 
in receiving large sums of money, being prooeeds from the 
sale of gold and ivory that were allegedly derived from 
the involvement of the Uganda army in the 1964-65 Cong.ole.se 
rebellion. In particular, the motion called for the immediate 
( 
suspension of Col.Amin who, apparently referred, to in the 
motion as the leading army officer, was charged together 
with some members of the government of planning to overthrow 
the constitution. The interesting side of the matter, was 
that before proceeding to undertake an upoountry tour, 
Obote had summoned the UPC parliamentary group which formed 
the majority in parliament and decided collectively that 
Ooheng's motion would not be allowed to be tabled for 
discussion. But as soon as Obote left Kampala, the motion 
was not only tabled and discussed but was also adopted by 
the seating UPC MPs in conjunction with, the DP and KY MPs. i 
The lonely dissenting vote was only registered- by John Kakonge. 
The political implications of this motion were 
enormous. A top military officer was to be suspended, 
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a dioision that, was certainly destined to cause uneasiness 
in the leadership and ranks of the army. As was common 
elsewhere- in Africa that: year, such action would probably 
have led to a military intervention and the overthrow of 
Obote. But most, significantly, Obote-and his olose ministers 
were to be investigated for gross misdemeanour in receiving 
and putting to private use unauthorized funds. Such action 
was calculated to undermine Obote1 s power and source of 
legitimacy as the leader, of government. 
But Obote took this challenge with characteristic calm. 
He. completed his tour: as scheduled and upon his return tr. 
the capital proceeded to move very fast to deal a decisive, 
blow on those colleagues in government that were plotting 
against him. On 22nd February, 1966 and contrary to the 
provisions of the constitution, Obote assumed full powers-
of government and ordered the arrest and detention of five 
ministers of his government, including G-raoe Ibingira. 
I t is worth Noting, for the sake of our interest in inter-
ethnic relations and souroes of conflict, that all those 
arrested and detained were southern Bantu politicians. 
Shis Was followed on 24:th February by the suspension of 
the constitution itself, which effectively removed the Kabaka 
of Buganda, Sir Bdjarar.d Muresa, from the office of President 
and Head of State-; ?#>ich he had occupied since 19'63- under: 
the terms of the UPC~KY alliance'. Then in April 1966 Obote 
removed all doubts tin. the direction to which he was 
heading by introduci^ to the National Assembly and having 
that, body adopt immediately without debate the 1966 interim 
republican constitution which made him President and Head of 
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The most important political outcome of the 1966 crisis, 
for our purpose, was the abrogation of the Independence-
Constitution which had been the symbol of political pluralism 
in the country and the increasing accumulation of power by 
the central government. For sure, the tampering with the 
constitution, which had been the chief souroe of the power 
of the Bugand®. Kingdom under the Kabaka, and the assumption 
of extra - constitutional powers by the central government 
under Obote, oould not go unchallenged. 
In numerous resolutions which culminated in the last 
one in May 1966 that called upon the central government, to 
remove its seat of government from Buganda soil, the Buganda 
Lukiiko engaged in a bitter political struggle for the sur-
vival of the institution *f Kabakaship and the Buganda State. 
In a sharp reaction, the central government interpreted this 
resolution as an act of rebellion by Buganda and provided 
Obote with the opportunity to lauch an armed attack on the 
Kabaka's palace under the pretext of looking for arms that 
were planned for use in the rebellion. After a spirited 
battle, the Kabaka's forces at the palace oapitulated and 
, Sir Edward Mutesa fled into exile, leaving behind the ruins 
- historical 
of a kingdom that had played a central role in the .political 
22 
development of Uganda. 
The defeat and dismembenaent of the Kingdom of Buganda 
marked the end of subnational centres of power that were 
organized around ethnic groups and ushered in an era of a 
highly centralized Ugandan state. Henceforth, there was to 
be.one major centre; of power - the central government - to 
which all Ugandan elites were to look for political 
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participation and employment.. I t was from this time that 
the importance of controlling power at the centre dawned on 
many political elites who had hitherto contented themselves 
and 
with participation in Buganda politics^ elsewhere in 
district political units. The narrowing of areas of part-
icipation and political power at one centre resulted in 
intense political struggle among political elites for the 
control of the central government. And since the 1966 cria.s 
had dramatized those events as the struggle for power 
between the southern Bantu and the northern Nilotics, the 
struggle for participation and power in Uganda oame to be 
seen and interpreted largely in ethnic terms. 
The Republican Constitution and One-Party State. 
After his triumph in 1966, 'Obote proceeded to make-
preparations for the complete elimination of all oentres and 
symbols of rival power. This was achieved following the 
adoption of the 1967 republican constitution which i s 
currently in force. A leading provision of that constitution 
declared that "The Institution of king or Ruler of a kingdom 
or Constitutional Head of a District, by whatever name 
called, existing before^ the commencement of this constitution 
under the law then in force, is hereby abolished".2^ 
This provision did not only abolish the kingdoms which had 
been Obote's main source of political challenge before- the' 
events of 1966, but it: also effectively abolished the system 
of local government as had been established elsewhere in the 
nonkingdom areas:, A large section of elites oould no longer 
look to Distriot Councils for political participation or to 
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the public services of'district administrations for employ-
ment. Instead, they all looked to the centre in search of 
these Values. This resulted in the increase of political 
oonflict and tension among the competing members of ethnic 
groups. 
With the republican oonstItution.f.".malyin places and 
with the reins of power firmly in his hands, Obote then felt 
sufficiently strong and politically safe to embark on a 
socialist adventure?. Eor long, he had apparently kept his 
socialist tendencies under the carpet' because he had lacked 
sufficient power to reveal them, given the power equations 
within which he had to operate. But now this power he had 
and therefore., throughout 1968 and 1969, Obote made speeches 
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and released a series of literature ^ spelling out his 
government's intentions to follow a socialist path of 
development. His socialist package for Uganda Was adopted 
in December 1969 in Lugogo Indoor Studium in Kampala by the 
delegates conference1: of the ruling party. And then, as 
''Obote was leaving the conference hall late .in the evening 
at. the height of his political triumph, he was shot at and 
injured in the mouth by an intending assassin. The- attempted 
assassination was obviously blamed on the enemie.s of the-: 
impending socialist revolution in Uganda, which included 
both internal and external foroes. Obote took advantage 
of this event to strengthen his power and that of his govern-
ment further, by clamping down on opposition parties and 
declaring a one-party state in Uganda. 
The declaration of the ruling UPO as the only legal 
political party removed completely the remaining elements of 
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political pluralism in the country. Henceforth, political 
competition was confined only within the ruling party. -
Consequently, the stater became highly centralized and 
authoritarian. Political competition and the struggles for. 
power at the centre- became very acute. In order to retain 
power in the face of serious challenges from other quarters, 
both real and imaginary, Obote was increasingly forced 
to place his most trusted men in the key branches of the 
state apparatus. As it turned out these men happened to be 
members of his own ethnic group, the Langi, or those from 
the. ethnic group closely allied culturally to Obote' S', 
pc 
the Acholis. Such a preponderance of people from a few 
ethnio groups in the key centres of p^w.er gave the other: 
ethnic groups, which happened to represent the majority, 
a feeling of being politically dominated. This gave further 
impetus to other groups to struggle to control political 
power at the centre^. 
The magnitude of group struggle for power was dramatized 
violently by the 1971- military coup led by Idi Amin. Among 
the accusations leveled at Obote by the coup leaders was 
his favouritism for the langi and Acholi, particularly in. 
the army and intelligence services, Following the initial 
success of the coup>, Arnin and his ethnically determined 
supporters proceeded to eliminate the langi and Acholi from 
the a,rmy and to do precisely what they had accused. Obote 
of doing. He established a hegemony.that oontrolled 
political and military power for. eight years which was based 
on a coalition of ethnic, groups from the West Nile: district 
and southern Sudan to which Amin belonged or had close affinity*-
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After the fail of Idi Amin in 1979 and the two-year 
interim period of the Uganda National liberation Front (UNLF) 
administrations, Milton Obote and his UPC party came into 
power for the second time round following the disputed 1980 
general elections^ Once; again, he established a government 
that, was propped up by the dominance of the Langi and Acholi 
in the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). In response 
to this development, and particularly to the widespread 
belief that the 1980 elections had been rigged in favour, 
of the UPC, ^ Yoweri. Museveni organized a resistance movement 
and a guerilla army, both of which came to be dominated by 
the southern Bantu, most notably the Banyanlcole and the:-
Baganda.. Then in a crude twist of history, trouble developed 
-within the Aoholi-Langi alliance in the UNLA when Obote: was 
accused in early 1985- of bis old problem of ethnic 
favouratism. She Acholi officers accused him of favouring 
the Langi over the Acholi in appointments to top military 
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positions. In July of that year, the Acholi Oi'fi cexts 
under the leadership of General Tito Okello, the UNLA 
Commander, and the northern Brigade Commander, Bazilio Okello, 
broke ranks with their traditional Langi allies and overthrew 
Obote:'s government in a military coup. The new Head of State, 
General Tito Okello, proceeded to establish a coalition 
government in which the Acholis were evidently in dominant 29 
positions both in government the army. But Okallo's 
government was to be shortlived because, six months .later 
in January 1986, i t was-removed from power: by the force of 
arms of the NRA. Following the collapse of Ok ell o ' s govern-
ment and the disintegration of the. UNLA, Yoweri Museveni 
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established a government, currently in power, which i s 
30 
dominated by the southern Bantu. 
Thus, political conflicts and violenoe: in Uganda have 
tended to aoquire? ethnic dimensions in reoent years because 
of the excessive: centralization of power which has led the 
struggle to control the:- centre to be very intense indeed 
among the elite members of ethnic groups. In this struggle, 
political and military elites have tended to mobilize &nd 
use their ethnic, bases and resources, such as military 
manpower, in order to struggle effectively to control political 
power at the centra* Hence, the seemingly ethnic oonflicts 
and hostility in Uganda are basically political conflicts 
originating from the struggle-for popular demooraoy and 
political participation. As long as the active political 
elites are by the existing political structure required to 
participate only in one centre of power at the national level, 
the struggle for power will continue to reflect itself in 
seemingly inter-ethnic conflict and violence. And as long 
as the old mutual suspecion continues to exist among ethnic 
groups along the southern-northern divide, the more difficult 
it will be to achieve a national consensus which is so vital 
for political stability. 
POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION AND POLITIC AX STABILITY 
I have, persistently argued in this essay that'political 
centralization intensifies conflicts among (ethnic) groups 
while decentralization of power, tends to diffuse such 
conflicts. Basing analysis on the colonial system of local 
government and the provisions of political pluralism in the 
•Independence Constitution, I have shown how the dispersal of 
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power and responsibility among many local political units 
in Uganda tended to work in favour of political stability 
by keeping political conflicts among ethnio groups at the 
lowest Ivel . We have? demonstrated further, how the abolition 
of political decentralization in 1966 3nd the subsequent 
concentration of power- at the oentre, increased the tempo 
of political conflict that led to the development of a 
culture of violence and endemic political instability. 
With reference to the Nigerian post-independenoe experience 
we propose in this last section of the paper to take a 
further, i f brief, look at how: political decentralization 
may provide a viable framework for politioal stability by 
decongesting the centre of excessive political oonflict 
and undercutting the potentialities of ethnic atagonism. 
THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE 
Nigeria emerged into independence in 1960 with a three-
's! 
region federal structure. Each region, namely, the 
Northern, Western and Eastern regions, was organized around 
a dominant ethnic groupt the' Hausa/Eulani in the north, 
the Yoruba in the West and the Igbo in the East,. The federal 
arrangement provided ©ach constituent unit with a regional', 
government, headed by a Premier, and with a Regional Assembly 
\ \ 
constituted by elected representatives as the centre of 
political activity. This arrangement encouraged the develop-
ment and functioning of regionally-based political parties. 
Indeed, such parties existed and controlled the governments 
in their own regions. Thus the Northern Peoples Congress 
(NPC) led by Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto 
controlled the. Northern Regional government, Chief Obafemi 
Awolowo's Action Group (AG) was dominant in he Western region, 
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while Dr. ITnamdi Azikiwe: led the National Gounoil of Nigerian 
Citizens (NCNC), ® party that was in government in the Eastern 
region. By and large, the federal government remained a weak 
outfit that was run "by a weak coalition of the regionally-
based political parties, the control of which was an 
32 
unattractive proposition for many leading politicians. 
The preoccupation of the political parties then was to "be 
supreme in their own regions. The regions, therefore., rather 
than the federal centre became areas of intense 
political participation and activity. 
The three-region federal structure, however, tended to 
mask greatly the multi-ethnic nature of tho Nigerian society. 
The fact was that the three main ethnic groups around whioh 
the federal, structure, was organized, dominated other important, 
and in many oases very large, groups within the regions. 
Eor example, the Hausa/Eulahi in the north were seen to 
dominate other politically important groups such as the Tiv 
and the Idoma. Similarly, in the West, the majority Yoruba 
dominated many mid-west ethnic groups while in the East 
the Igbos dominated the; equally socially advanced Efiks and 
Ibibi os. Suoh an arrangement^ therefore, became a source 
of constant friction and tension between ethnic groups within 
the. regions and became a basis for the articulation of 
demands for further expansion of autonomous centres of power 
to meet the political aspirations of other important ethnic 
groups. 
I t was precisely in response to such demands, and 
pressures that the Mid-West region centred around the Benin 
ethnic groups, was curved out of the Western region in 1963 
to beoome the fourth region of the Nigerian federation. 
While this action gay® political solace to mid-western 
ethnic groups, lit certainly acted to fuel the demands of 
other 'minority' groups elsewhere for 'local self-deter--
mination,' Such demands became so widespread and reached 
such high degrees of intensity that, they were seen by many 
observers as constituting the greatest threat to the survival 
of the Nigerian nation as a single political entity. This 
was the state of affairs when the first military takeover 
of the federal government occured in January 1966 under • j 
the leadership of an Igbo commander, General Ironsi. 
Like many other; alarmed Nigerian leaders at the time, 
General Ironsi mistook the demands for further expansion 
of centres of power and democratization of the political 
structure for signs of political disintegration of the 
Nigerian state. In an attempt to quell what he saw as the 
forces of disintegration, he proceeded to promulgate a decree 
that abolished federalism and imposed a unitary form of 
the 
government in its' place throughout ^ country. This action 
created more problems than it solved; in fact, it made, 
matters worse. The- demands for the restoration of federalism 
in its expanded form, as earlier demanded, became intensified. 
Politioal calculation would have required General Ironsi to 
baok down. But hi sr. insi stance on the centralization of 
power under one unitary government led to the tragic end of 
his regime and his life in a counter.-coup of July 1966. 
On assumption of power, the new military leaders under 
the leadership of Lt.Col. Yakubu Gowon immediately recognized 
the reality, And the reality was that the best way to 
diffuse political tension and ethnic conflicts was not. to 
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narrow areas of. participation through the process of political 
centralization but rather, to expand them further, through 
decentralization and creation of greater numbers of 
autonomous centres of power.. In one of his' first few 
decisions in office, therefore, Gowon announced, the creation 
of the twelve-state federal structure that gave considerable 
concessions to the demands of many ethnic groups for greater 
political decentralization. The civil war. that erupted 
between the former Eastern region which styled itself as 
Biafra and the federal foroes prevented the immedicate: 
implementation of the new federal system. But when the war 
ended in 1970, Nigerian federalism began to thrive again on 
the new twelve-state structure. 
Although the division of the country into twelve states 
was certainly an improvement on the former four-region 
structure, the exercise was not based on careful study and 
thought. On the contrary, it was a haphazard decision that 
was taken to diffuse a serious political situation at the 
time. Accordingly, in demarcating state boundaries, no 
serious consideration was undertaken in grouping ethnic 
units together on the basis of affinities or compatibilities. 
The twelve-state structure was basically a replication of 
the old colonial provincial structure. Therefore, many 
ethnio groups found themselves either divided across state 
boundaries or seriously dominated by others. Accordingly, 
the demands for more., states continued to be championed by 
many ethnic groups, throughout the country. 
Following the coup of July 1975 that toppled the Gowon 
regime, a high ptwered Commission on the Creation of New-
States was set up to study the problem carefully and 
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recommend on how/ the problem was to be solved on a more or 
less permanent, basis. Basing on the recommendations of 
compassion, the present nineteen- state federal structure 
was established. Later, on i n 1976, Nigerian federalism 
was strengthened and. perfected by. the. establishment, of 
an elaborate system of. Local Government which provided even 
greater opportunity for political participation and decision-
making at the very local level. , 
In marked contrast with many other African countries, 
therefore, the political trends in Nigeria since independence 
have been in the direction of greater expansion of political 
pluralism through increased decentralization of power and 
diversification of centres of political participation. 
The Nigerian federalism is constituted by three tiers of 
government. At. the. lowest level, there are the more; 
numerous political and administrative units in the form of 
Local Governments. These serve the needs of the local elites 
and smaller ethnic groups for participation and political 
decision-making. At a higher level,, there are the larger 
centre^ of power in the form of states with all oompliments 
of the institutions, and resources of government. I t i s at 
th^ f state level that a greater, number, of Nigerian political 
a)ld administrative, elites aspire to participate. Then, 
there is the federal centre whose political and admini-
strative elites constitute a weak coalition of political 
forces and ethnic groups in the federation. Although the 
federal centre controls enormous national resources and 
commands supreme, power in the land, i t is not the major 
target of political activity. In go far as the states control 
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local ir.esouro©H' and provide services that are nearer to the 
people, ii^tke states that constitute the main oentrees for 
meeting the political and economic aspirations of the 
majority of the Nigerian people. Indeed, Nigerians-within 
Nigeria are; identified, on identify themselves on the basis 
of the state of their origin . I t is the state- identity that" 
' } ' -
determines what benefit® one can get in terms of such things 
as employment, scholarship or even a school adminission for 
ones child. The state, therefore, i s a political unit around 
which peoples hopes, aspirations, sentiments and loyalties 
are attached. 
In the final analysis, the Nigerian experiment' at the 
atomization of power has, since, the Civil War., gone along 
way in providing a framework for political harmony and 
stability in the context of ethnic diversity. What per.tgins 
in Nigeria now is not a situation of conflict and hostility 
among ethnic group a, as was predominantly the oase during 
the era of the three-region power structure when the base 
of. participation was7 still narrow for many elites, but a 
situation of competition and rivalry among them. Ethnic 
groups organized in states compete with each other for the 
allocation of federal resources; they compete among them-
selves for the achievement of further rates of development 
in terms of good roads, number of schools, hospitals", number, 
of dootors and other highly qualified personnel. In this' 
sense, political decentralisation in Nigeria has not only 
provided a basis for the; control of inter-ethnio conflicts 
but has also given impetus to a dynamic process of social 
and eoonomio progress in the oountry. 
CONCLUSION 
In citing the Nigerian example here, the idea is 
certainly not to advrrcate for that country's style of 
governmental organization as a political device for 
controlling political violence-, and inter-ethhio conflicts 
in Uganda. Rather, the purpose has been to demonstrate, 
"borrowing from that example, the importance of the principle 
of political decentralization in the control of group 
conflict, particularly of ethnio kind. As has been indicated 
this principle was first; tried in Uganda by the colonial 
government in the 195.0s with remarkable success. And before 
its dissolution in 1962, the sajne government embodied the 
same principle in the Independence Constitution. For the 
first three or four years, the principle of the exi stance 
of diverse oentres of power was tolerated. This ensured 
political stability for the country during the period. 
Not. until 1966 when this principle was grossly violated and 
then Obote embarked relentlessly on the process of political 
centralization, that the period of aoute conflict and 
violence which has since characterized Uganda's political 
life actually set in. 
It should be pointed out that decentralization of 
power and unit am. sm as7 a system of government are not. 
mutually exclusive:^ It' is perfectly possible to have a 
strong central government existing side by side and in 
harmony with a strong system of local government. What is 
neoessary is^ to broaden areas of political participation 
and decision-making, by creating local politioal units that 
individually or collectively cannot successfully challenge 
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and! oripple the centre. Such amount of power and responsi-
bility are then surrendered to them to perform functions 
and provide services to the local people that are basically 
complementary to those, of the centre. I t is a strong 
system of looal government that can provide the much desired 
opportunities for. ethnic groups to manage affairs that are 
of vital interest to them. It is the same system that-can 
satisfy the needs of the masses of people for popular 
democracy. And i t is the satisfaction of those basic 
political needs that can minimize the incidenoe of political 
conflict and violence in Uganda and ensure the political 
stability and socio-economic progress if the oountry. 
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the colonial invading armies and secondly, as a present: 
to Buganda for assisting the British to defeat the 
Bunyoro resistance. After successfully dodging its-
responsibility for settling the problem it had created, 
the departing British left it to the government'-of 
independent. Uganda to settle by holding a referendum 
in the disputed counties after two years of independence. 
This 'the oentral government under Prime - Minister Apolo 
Milton Obote did and two of the counties "under, dispute 
were returned to Bunyorc and the dispute was finally 
solved. 
15 . The Kanaka's Government resorted to oourt litigation 
each time it thought that the central government was 
acting oontrary t* the provisions of and powers 
conferred on i t by the constitution. For a discussion of 
this see-, Ali .A. Mazrui, "Violent Constitutionalism 
in Uganda", Government and Opposition, Vol. 11 No.4 
(July - October 1967) . 
16.' I t was from the strained relationships between the 
governments of Buganda and Uganda that the Kabaka and 
the Buganda lukiiko became mobilized to play increas-
ingly activist., roles in the affairs of the central 
government. Otherwise, both the Kabaka and -the Lukiiko 
had been interested primarily in the Buganda affairs. 
1.7. See, A .G .G , Gingyera-Pnycwa, Apolo Hilton Obote. and 
His Times (New York, London, Lagos: Nok Publishers, 
1978) , Introduction, 
18 . The Kabaka Yekka (KY) was more^ of a politioal movement 
than a political party. I t emerged suddenly in early 
1961 and spread rapidly throughout Buganda, As its 
name suggests,, (Kabaka Yeklta - Kabaka Only or King Only) 
it was-mainly interested in matters related to 
Buggpda, more, particularly in the preservation of the 
institution of the Kabakaship. 
19 . see, for instance, A.M. Obote, "The Footsteps of 
Uganda's Revolution", E&st'- African Journal., VoI.V. 
No.10, October. 1968 and A .G .G . Gingyera-Pinyawa, op.cit. 
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28. This was one major, reason given for the July 1985" coup 
against Obote's government, of. General Toto Okello's 
maiden address to the Nation carried by Radio Uganda 
July 29, 1985. 
29. The Military strongman, Bazilio Okello, a close ally 
of General Tito Okello, was made the Commander of 
Defence Forces'. The Cabinet and appointments to top 
positions in p-arastatals reflected clearly the dominance 
of the Acholis. 
30. Again one needs to lb ok at the ethnio oomposition of 
the Cabinet and top Commonders of the NRA to see the 
preponderance of people from the southern Bantu, 
31. The discussion of the Nigerian federalism and its 
problems that follows i s based largely on Professor 
E .O . Awa's two, books-: Federal Government in Nigeria; 
(Berkeley; University of California Press, 1964) and 
Issues in Federalism Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 1976). 
32. At independence and after the general elections of 
1965, the Coalition federal government.was made up by 
two regionally-based political parties, namely, the 
NPC and the NCNC,. The regions were so powerful and 
the oontrol of their governments more attractive than 
the oontrol of federal government that the most 
powerful politician of the time, Alhaji Sir- Ahmadu Bello 
decided at- independence to remain as the Premier: of the 
Northern Region and to - send his protege, Alhaji Sir 
Abubakar Tafaw® Balewa, to head the Federal Government ' 
as Prime Minister: on behalf of the majority NPC party 
of which Alhaji Sir Ahjnadu Bello himself was the leader* 
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